The Mens Rea Dilemma for Aiding and Abetting a
Felon in Possession
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INTRODUCTION

Under 18 USC § 922(g)(1), convicted felons may not possess firearms, and violators can be punished with up to ten years in prison.'
Congress's intent in prohibiting the possession of firearms by felons
was to "eliminate firearms from the hands of criminals, while interfering as little as possible with the law abiding citizen."2 An individual who
aids and abets a felon's firearm ownership' can be charged as an accomplice to the felon-in-possession offense, pursuant to 18 USC § 2(a).'
The circuit courts currently are split over whether a defendant
charged with aiding and abetting a felon under § 922(g)(1) can be held
strictly liable for knowing the principal's status as a convicted felon.
While the Ninth Circuit applies a strict liability standard, the Third
and Sixth Circuits insist that the defendant must possess knowledge or
"reasonable cause to believe" that the principal is a convicted felon
for the defendant to be convicted as an accomplice under § 922(g)(1).
This Comment argues that courts should apply the knowing or
"reasonable cause to believe" standard; at the same time, concurrent
felonious activity should trigger a rebuttable presumption that the
defendant possessed "reasonable cause to believe" that the principal
was a convicted felon. This Comment defines "concurrent felonious
activity" as occurring when the defendant aides the principal's violation of § 922(g)(1) in order to further a separate felony offense engaged in by the defendant and the principal.
This Comment's solution would make the mens rea standard
harder to evade in cases where the defendant actually possesses
" BFA 2002, Carnegie Mellon University; MM 2004, The University of Texas at Austin; JD
Candidate 2010, The University of Chicago Law School.
1 See 18 USC § 922(g)(1); 18 USC § 924(a) (providing the penalty for violations of
§ 922(g)(1)).
2
United States v Weatherford, 471 F2d 47, 51 (7th Cir 1971) (indicating that the congressional intent behind 18 USC § 922(g)(1) is "crystal clear"). See note 15 and accompanying text.
3
In this Comment, a felon who possesses a firearm in violation of § 922(g)(1) is referred
to as the principal.
4
18 USC § 2(a) (stating that "[w]hoever commits an offense against the United States or
aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal"). In this Comment, the terms "aider and abettor" and "accomplice" are used interchangeably.
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awareness of the principal's felon status, and is therefore an improvement over the current application of the "reasonable cause to believe"
standard. Even when the defendant does not possess such knowledge,
however, the solution can be justified on the grounds that the separate
felonious activity puts the defendant "on notice" to expect firearms
regulation. Once criminal activity is involved, the firearm is no longer
being used solely to pursue innocent endeavors, and therefore the defendant should expect heightened regulation. In addition, the principal's engagement in a concurrent felony indicates a sixfold increase in
the probability that the principal committed a past felony, as compared to the general adult population,' thus supporting the defendant's assumption of the burden in such circumstances.
Unlike strict liability, however, this solution preserves the consonance between § 922(g)(1) and 922(d)(1), another provision aimed
at keeping firearms from convicted felons. Section 922(g)(1) proscribes possession of a firearm by a felon, while § 922(d)(1) proscribes
the sale or disposal of a firearm to a felon. When § 922(g)(1) is
coupled with accomplice liability, there is the potential for significant
overlap with § 922(d)(1). In contrast to § 922(g)(1), however,
§ 922(d)(1) contains the mens rea of knowledge or "reasonable cause
to believe" with respect to the possessor's status as a felon. Adopting
strict liability for the felon's status in § 922(g)(1), therefore, could
create the potential for prosecutors to circumvent the mens rea provided by Congress in § 922(d)(1). This Comment, therefore, adopts the
more legally defensible standard of knowledge or "reasonable cause
to believe," while combining this standard with a rebuttable presumption that captures some policy benefits better served by strict liability.
The Comment proceeds as follows: Part I explores the background and text of § 922(g)(1) and provides a brief overview of principal and accomplice liability under the provision. Part II examines
the split between the circuit courts regarding the correct mens rea for
the principal's felon status in the context of aiding a felon in possession under § 922(g)(1). Part III discusses the advantages and drawbacks inherent in the competing sides of the circuit split, and ultimately concludes that the knowledge or "reasonable cause to believe"
standard must be retained for the sake of preserving congressional
intent with respect to § 922(d)(1). Part IV proposes that the knowledge or "reasonable cause to believe" standard would be improved if
coupled with a rebuttable presumption that the defendant had "reasonable cause to believe" the principal was a felon in circumstances

5

See note 165 and accompanying text.
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where the § 922(g)(1) offense was committed in furtherance of separate felonious activity.
I. BACKGROUND: THE TEXT AND HISTORY OF 18 USC § 922(G)(1) IN
THE CONTEXT OF PRINCIPAL AND ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY
This Part begins with a brief history of congressional attempts to
regulate the possession of firearms by convicted felons. Part I.B discusses § 922(g)(1), which was enacted as part of the Firearms Owners'
Protection Act of 1986. The remainder of Part I describes the mens
rea issues that have arisen in the context of both principal and accomplice liability under § 922(g)(1).
A.

Historical Overview

The United States has a long history of restricting the ability of
convicted felons to obtain firearms. One of the first federal firearms
statutes, the Federal Firearms Act of 1938,' banned receipt of a firearm
by individuals previously convicted of a "crime of violence."' This prohibition was expanded in the coming decades until it eventually applied to all felons.9 The next major overhaul of firearms legislation
occurred with the passage of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968.0 The Act made it unlawful to "sell or otherwise
dispose of any firearm" to a convicted felon." Nearly two decades later, the Firearms Owners' Protection Act of 1986 .2 (FOPA) was passed,
despite intense lobbying by the firearms industry."

6

See generally David T. Hardy, The Firearms Owners' Protection Act. A Historicaland

Legal Perspective, 17 Cumb L Rev 585 (1987).
7
Federal Firearms Act, 15 USC §§ 901-10 (1938) (repealed 1968).
8
See 15 USC § 901 (1938). See also Hardy, 17 Cumb L Rev at 598 n 71 (cited in note 6)
(comparing the 1938,1947, and 1961 versions of the Act).
9 See Hardy, 17 Cumb L Rev at 598 n 71 (cited in note 6). In 1947, "crime of violence" was
defined to include burglary, housebreaking, and many forms of assault. Act of Mar 10, 1947, 61
Stat 11, codified at 15 USC § 901 (1952). In 1961, the prohibition was extended to all convicted
felons. Act of Oct 3,1961, Pub L No 87-342,75 Stat 757, codified at 15 USC § 901 (1964).
10 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub L No 90-351,82 Stat 197,225,
codified at 18 USC § 901(a)(1) (1970).
11 Id.
12 The Firearms Owners' Protection Act of 1986, Pub L 99-308, 100 Stat 449, codified as
amended at 18 USC §§ 921-29 (1988).
13 See Hardy, 17 Cumb L Rev at 585, 605, 606 & n 115 (cited in note 6) (noting the resistance from the National Rifle Association, which had five full-time federal lobbyists at the time).
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The Statute: 18 USC § 922(g)(1)

B.

Section 922(g)(1) was enacted in 1986 as part of FOPA." The
provision is a consolidation of portions of three former provisions of
Title 18 that regulated possession of firearms by convicted felons."
Under the current version of § 922(g)(1), it is
unlawful for any person ...who has been convicted in any court

of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year ... to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or

possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or
to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or
transported in interstate or foreign commerce."
The reference to a "crime punishable by a term of imprisonment
exceeding one year" is simply another way of describing a felony offense." Put more clearly, the elements of §922(g)(1) can be broken
down as follows: (1) the defendant had a previous felony conviction;
(2) the defendant possessed a firearm or ammunition; and (3) the firearm or ammunition traveled in or affected interstate commerce."
Part I.C discusses the mens rea issues raised by § 922(g)(1).
C. The Mens Rea for 18 USC § 922(g)(1)
Section 922(g)(1) implicates several mens rea issues, not all of
which are resolved by the language of the provision. Part I.C.1 provides a brief description of mens rea for the conduct element of
§ 922(g)(1), followed in Part I.C.2 by a discussion of mens rea for the
circumstance element of § 922(g)(1) in the context of principal liability. Part I concludes with an analysis of mens rea for the circumstance
element of § 922(g)(1) in the context of accomplice liability, an issue
that has prompted a circuit split.
1.

The mens rea for § 922(g)(1)'s conduct element.

The predecessor statutes to § 922(g)(1) did not contain any express mens rea requirements." However, courts interpreted these staSee FOPA § 102, 100 Stat at 449.
See United States v Langley, 62 F3d 602, 604 (4th Cir 1995). The three former provisions are:
§ 922(g)(1) (unlawful for convicted felon to ship or transport a firearm in interstate commerce);
§ 922(h)(1) (unlawful for convicted felon to receive a firearm that has been shipped or transported in interstate commerce); and § 1202(a) (18 USC App) (unlawful for convicted felon to
receive, possess, or transport a firearm in or affecting commerce). Id.
16
18 USC § 922(g)(1).
17 See Langley, 62 F3d at 603 n 1 (noting that the two terms are "used interchangeably").
18 United States v Gardner,488 F3d 700,713 (6th Cir 2007).
19 See Langley, 62 F3d at 604.
14

15
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tutes to require the defendant to have knowingly "received, transported, or possessed" the firearm.) In other words, the predecessor
statutes were not strict liability offenses with respect to the conduct
element of the crime.
Like its predecessor statutes, the current version of § 922(g)(1)
contains no explicit mens rea language. When Congress enacted
§ 922(g) in 1986, however, it amended 18 USC § 924(a)(2)-the penalty provision for § 922-to penalize only knowing violations of
§ 922(g)(1). 2 ' The result is that § 922(g)(1) does not afford strict liability with regards to the conduct element of the offense -defendants
must knowingly possess, ship, or transport a firearm in order to be
subject to the provision's penalty.
2. The mens rea for § 922(g)(1)'s circumstance element for principal liability.
The federal criminal code does not provide a mens rea requirement for the statutory element of the defendant's status as a convicted
felon under § 922(g)(1). The text of § 922(g)(1) does not specify a
mens rea requirement for the defendant's criminal history; nor does
§ 924(a)(2) speak directly to this issue. Though perhaps not obvious,
there are circumstances in which a defendant reasonably is unaware
of his status as a convicted felon." Courts interpreted the predecessor
statutes to § 922(g)(1) such that the defendant could be convicted
even if he lacked knowledge of his own felon status., In other words,
under the predecessor statutes, the defendant was held strictly liable
for his criminal history.
Courts currently disagree as to whether the mens rea term "knowingly" in § 924(a)(2) should extend to the substantive circumstance
element of the crime-the defendant's status as a convicted felon-in
the context of § 922(g)(1) principal liability.2 A substantial majority of

20

Id.

18 USC § 924(a)(2) ("Whoever knowingly violates ...section 922[g] shall be fined as
provided in this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both."). See also United States v
Sherbondy, 865 F2d 996, 1002 (9th Cir 1988) ("[I]t is highly likely that Congress used section
924(a) simply to avoid having to add 'willful' or 'knowing' into every subsection of section 922.").
22 One such example is when the defendant has been granted a pardon. See, for example,
United States v Laxey, 2004 WL 413215, *1 (5th Cir) (affirming the applicability of § 922(g)(1) to
a defendant who had been pardoned).
23
See, for example, United States v Schmitt, 748 F2d 249,252 (5th Cir 1984); United States v
Lupino, 428 F2d 720,723-24 (8th Cir 1973).
24 Although the interstate travel requirement is also a circumstance element, courts distinguish between jurisdictional and substantive elements of a crime. Purely jurisdictional provisions
"need not contain the same culpability requirement as other elements of the offense." United
States v Yermian, 468 US 63, 68-74 (1984) (holding that proof of actual knowledge of federal
21
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courts continue to hold the defendant strictly liable for his felon status
under § 922(g)(1). The Fourth Circuit's decision in United States v
Langley,n which exemplifies the majority approach, interprets the
knowledge requirement in § 924(a) as extending only to the conduct
element of § 922(g)(1)." The Langley court determined that Congress
did not provide the clear manifestation of contrary intent that would
be necessary "to displace the presumption that Congress created the
FOPA version of § 922(g)(1) consistent with existing law and the settled judicial understanding of § 922(g)(1)'s predecessor statutes."'
However, as Langley's heated partial dissent suggests, some controversy still exists over whether a defendant should be held strictly
liable for his own felon status under § 922(g)(1).8 Those who are critical
of the majority position cite Supreme Court precedent to argue that
strict liability should not apply to a circumstance element that criminalizes "otherwise innocent" behavior.29 This line of reasoning advances
the so-called "Morissette presumption."" The Morissette presumption
requires that "unless statutory language or legislative history evinces a
contrary intent, a nonspecific mens rea requirement was intended by
Congress to run to each of the statutory elements which criminalize
otherwise innocent behavior."3' Because the courts following the Morissette presumption consider possession of a firearm under § 922(g)(1) to

agency jurisdiction is not required to convict for making a false or fraudulent statement within
the jurisdiction of a federal agency).
25
62 F3d 602 (4th Cir 1995).
26
27

Id at 604-05.
Id at 606.

28
See id at 609-19 (Phillips concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Although Congress
obviously intended 'knowingly' to impose a knowledge requirement with respect to some of the
'black-letter' elements of the § 922(g)(1) offense ...the word in context does not plainly indicate
which of those elements Congress had in mind.") (citation omitted). See also Gardner,488 F3d at
715 n 2 (acknowledging that the question of mens rea for the principal with respect to his felon
status is not fully settled); United States v Kitsch, 2008 WL 2971548, *4 (ED Pa) (expressing
agreement with the reasoning of the Langley dissent).
29
See, for example, Langley, 62 F3d at 614 (Phillips concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Kitsch, 2008 WL 2971548 at *4 (applying the "Morissette presumption ... that mens rea
extends to elements that take otherwise lawful conduct and subject it to criminal sanction"). See
also Morissette v United States, 342 US 246,271 (1952).
30
See Langley, 62 F3d at 615 (Phillips concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation
and quotation marks omitted). In Morisette, the defendant had been convicted by the trial court
of converting government bomb casings found on a government target range. 342 US at 247. The
Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that although no mens rea was specified under
the statute for the circumstance element of the crime, the statute required knowledge as to whether
the property was abandoned and hence capable of being stolen or converted. Id at 275-76.
31
Langley, 62 F3d at 614 (Phillips concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted). The Langley dissent stresses that the Morissette presumption "runs not only to those elements that define the core conduct proscribed but also to any elements that define circumstances
upon which criminality of the conduct turns." Id.
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be "otherwise innocent behavior," they claim that the knowledge 32requirement in § 924(a)(2) should extend to the defendant's felon status.
Although not the main issue of this Comment, the disagreement
over the mens rea for principal liability under § 922(g)(1) is relevant
to understanding the circuit split over accomplice liability under
§ 922(g)(1). The Ninth Circuit justifies the application of strict liability
to an accomplice on the grounds that the principal is held strictly liable
for his own felon status. 3 Were strict liability not applied to the principal, the Ninth Circuit's reasoning would be undermined. Moreover, the
Morissette presumption, discussed here in the context of principal liability, has implications for the solution that this Comment offers in Part IV."
3.

The mens rea for § 922(g)(1)'s circumstance element for accomplice liability.

Like other federal offenses, a defendant can be charged under
§ 922(g)(1) as an accomplice rather than as a principal. Under
18 USC § 2(a), "Whoever commits an offense against the United
States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its
commission, is punishable as a principal."3 When combined with
§ 922(g)(1), this statute creates accomplice liability in circumstances
where the defendant aids and abets a felon's possession of a firearm.
An accomplice to § 922(g)(1) can be punished to the same degree as
the principal-in this case, with up to ten years in prison.
The elements that the government traditionally must show to
prove aiding and abetting are: (1) an act by a defendant that contributes to the commission of a crime; and (2) the intent to aid in the
commission of the crime. 7 Judge Learned Hand famously noted that
the terms "aid" and "abet" demand that the defendant "in some sort
associate himself with the venture, that he participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make
it succeed."38 Judge Hand further suggested that "even the most color-

32
See id at 609-19 (Phillips concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge James Phillips's partial dissent distinguishes between the "substantive" circumstance element and the "jurisdictional" circumstance element for the purpose of applying the Morissette presumption. See id at
618-19 (arguing that the interstate commerce element is not a fact that makes the defendant's
conduct illegal for purposes of applying the presumption). See also note 24 and accompanying text.
33 See United States v Canon, 993 F2d 1439,1442 (9th Cir 1993).
34 See Part IV.B.3.
35
18 USC § 2(a).
36 18 USC § 924(a)(2).
37 See United States v Lawson, 872 F2d 179,181 (6th Cir 1989).
38
United States v Peoni, 100 F2d 401,402-03 (2d Cir 1938) (holding that the defendant was
not an accessory to possession of counterfeit bills following his sale of the bills to a third party).
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less" words used to characterize accomplice liability "carry an implication of purposive attitude towards [the venture]."3
It is worth noting that charges of accomplice liability under
§ 922(g)(1) frequently arise in situations where the principal and the
accomplice engaged in additional, concurrently felonious conduct.Defendants rarely are charged only with accomplice liability under
§ 922(g)(1).' This may be explained by the fact that the crime is likely
to go undetected except in situations where the perpetrators are
caught engaging in other criminal activity. Also, prosecutors may have
a greater incentive to prosecute § 922(g)(1) violations when additional
criminal wrongdoing is involved.
A complication created by accomplice liability under § 922(g)(1)
arises from its potential conflict with another provision regulating the
possession of firearms by convicted felons: 18 USC § 922(d)(1). Section 922(d)(1) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person to sell or otherwise dispose of
any firearm or ammunition to any person knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that such person ...has been convicted

in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year."

Broadly speaking, § 922(d)(1) proscribes the sale or disposal of a firearm to a felon, whereas § 922(g)(1) proscribes the possession of a firearm by a felon.
Congress enacted § 922(d) in the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968 due to concern about "a widespread traffic in
firearms moving in or otherwise affecting interstate or foreign commerce.""3 Congress further found that "the ease with which any person
can acquire firearms other than a rifle or shotgun (includingcriminals...)
is a significant factor in the prevalence of lawlessness and violent crime

Id at 402.
See, for example, Gardner, 488 F3d at 706 (involving drug charges); United States v
Lombard, 72 F3d 170, 173 n 1 (1st Cir 1995) (same); United States v Moore, 936 F2d 1508, 1511
(7th Cir 1991) (same).
41 But see United States v Samuels, 521 F3d 804, 808 (7th Cir 2008) (involving a defendant
charged only with aiding and abetting a felon in possession). In Samuels, the defendant gave the
principal a firearm immediately prior to a brawl where the defendant and the principal beat a man
unconscious. Id at 808-09. It is worth noting that although the defendant was charged only with the
§ 922(g)(1) offense, he had apparently been engaged in some other criminal activity with the principal.
42 18 USC § 922(d)(1).
43 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, § 901,82 Stat at 225.
39

40
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in the United States."" Critically, the original version of § 922(d) applied only to licensed federal firearms dealers and manufacturers."
The limitation of the law to federal firearms dealers and manufacturers created a loophole, however, "whereby qualified purchasers
...
acquired firearms from licensees on behalf of prohibited persons.""
In other words, a third party would be used to facilitate sales that
would otherwise be illegal due to the purchaser's felon status. To prevent this abuse, Congress amended the statute in 1986 as part of
FOPA so that it applied to "any person" rather than just licensed firearms dealers and manufacturers. 7
Sections 922(g)(1) and 922(d)(1) contain virtually identical language.4' There are only two relevant differences in the texts of these
provisions. First, as stated above, § 922(d)(1) proscribes the sale or
disposal of a firearm to a felon, whereas § 922(g)(1) proscribes the
possession of a firearm by a felon. Also-crucial to the issue at hand§ 922(d)(1) establishes a mens rea requirement for the substantive
circumstance element of the crime. In order to be convicted, the defendant must have sold or disposed of a weapon to a convicted felon
while "knowing or having reasonable cause to believe" that the recipient of the weapon was a convicted felon. ' As noted above,
§ 922(g)(1) contains no such mens rea language with regard to the
felon's status. This discrepancy creates the potential for prosecuting
defendants as accomplices under § 922(g)(1) rather than as principal
violators under § 922(d)(1)-a tempting option if the former provision
were to afford strict liability as to the felon's status.
To summarize the legislative history, Congress passed § 922(d)(1)
in 1968 to ban the sale or disposal of firearms to convicted felons. In
1986, Congress consolidated three provisions regulating firearms and
convicted felons into the current version of § 922(g)(1), which bans the
possession of firearms by convicted felons." At the same time, Congress
amended § 922(d)(1) so that it applied to "any person" and not just licensed firearms dealers and manufacturers. Unlike § 922(d)(1), however, § 922(g)(1) does not contain a mens rea requirement for the possessor's status as a convicted felon. This discrepancy creates the poten12

Id (emphasis added).
FOPA, HR Rep No 99-495,99th Cong, 2d Sess, reprinted in 1986 USCCAN 1327, 1343.
46 Id.
47 See FOPA, § 102,100 Stat at 449.
48 Compare 18 USC § 922(g)(1), with 18 USC § 922(d)(1). In addition, § 922(g)(2) and
922(d)(2) share virtually identical language, as do § 922(g)(3) and 922(d)(3), and so forth.
49
18 USC § 922(d)(1).
5o See notes 10-11, 44-45 and accompanying text.
51 See notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
52 See note 47 and accompanying text.
44
45
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tial for an end run around § 922(d)(1), a possibility that partially motivates the circuit split over accomplice liability under § 922(g)(1).
II. THE DISAGREEMENT AMONG THE CIRCUIT COURTS

The circuit courts currently are split as to whether a defendant
charged with aiding and abetting a felon in possession can be held
strictly liable for the principal's status as a convicted felon. The Ninth
Circuit has determined that strict liability applies to the principal's
status, while the Third and Sixth Circuits have ruled that the defendant must have possessed knowledge or "reasonable cause to believe"
that the principal was a convicted felon in order for the defendant to
be convicted as an accomplice under § 922(g)(1).
A.

Strict Liability and the Ninth Circuit

The Ninth Circuit has chosen an approach that makes it easier to
convict defendants charged with aiding and abetting a felon in possession
under §922(g)(1). In United States v Canon,"3 the Ninth Circuit ruled that
that an accomplice to § 922(g)(1) need not possess knowledge or "reasonable cause to believe" that the principal is a convicted felon. ,
Canon involved two defendants, Douglas Canon and Robert Delang, who led police on a high-speed chase after the police tried to pull
them over for a broken taillight.55 During the chase, Canon fired at the
officers from the passenger window." An officer claimed that he saw
Delang give something resembling a firearm to Canon prior to the
shooting." Both defendants were convicted felons, and both were
charged under § 922(g)(1)." Canon was charged as a principal and
held strictly liable for his own felon status." Delang was charged as an
accomplice to Canon's violation of § 922(g)(1), and the Ninth Circuit
also held Delang strictly liable for Canon's status."
The court reasoned that because a principal is strictly liable for
his own felon status, "[n]o greater knowledge requirement" should
apply to an accomplice." According to the Ninth Circuit, the government needed to prove only that Delang, as an aider and abettor, "associate[d] himself with [Canon's crime], that he participate[d] in it as
53

993 F2d 1439 (9th Cir 1993).

54
55

Id at 1442.
Id at 1440.

56

Id at 1440-41.

57 Canon, 993 F2d
58 Id.

at 1440-41.

59

Id at 1442.

60

Id.
Canon, 993 F2d at 1442.

61
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in something that he wishe[d] to bring about, [and] that he [sought] by
his action to make it succeed."62
In United States v Graves," the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed Canon by
stating, in dicta, that an accomplice can be held strictly liable for the
principal's status under § 922(g)(1). 4 Graves involved a man named

Shawn Prince who brandished his gun at a naval base party while
shouting at his girlfriend.65 When officers arrived on the scene and arrested Prince, the defendant Lyndon Graves aided Prince in escaping
from the patrol car and disposing of his weapon." Prince was a con-

victed felon, and Graves was later charged under 18 USC § 3 as an
accessory after the fact to Prince's violation of § 922(g)(1). 7 The court
distinguished between after-the-fact accessory liability and accomplice
liability, holding that only the former requires actual knowledge of the
principal's status as a felon."
The Ninth Circuit noted that strict liability for an accomplice "is
consistent with the general rule that knowledge of an aider and abettor need be no greater than the knowledge of the principal."6 9 The
court did suggest that § 922(g)(1) might present a "logical exception"
to this rule, as "there is no reason an aider and abettor should be presumed to have [ ] knowledge" of the principal's felon status." The
court also expressed "serious reservations" about Canon because the

opinion "contain[ed] no analysis in support of its conclusion."'" Even
so, the Ninth Circuit has never revisited its holding in favor of strict
liability, and Canon remains good law. 2

Id. See also United States v Peoni,100 F2d 401,402 (2d Cir 1938).
143 F3d 1185 (9th Cir 1998).
64 Idat 1188n 3.
65 Id at 1186.
66 Id.
67
Graves, 143 F3d at 1186-87. See 18 USC § 3 ("Whoever, knowing that an offense against
the United States has been committed, receives, relieves, comforts or assists the offender in order
to hinder or prevent his apprehension, trial or punishment, is an accessory after the fact.").
68 Idat 1189.
69
Id at 1188 n 3.
62
63

70

Id.

Graves, 143 F3d at 1188 n 3.
The Seventh Circuit has also considered the issue several times, but has never firmly
decided whether an accomplice to § 922(g)(1) can be held strictly liable for the principal's felon
status. In United States v Moore, 936 F2d 1508 (7th Cir 1991), the court indicated implicit support
for the Ninth Circuit's strict liability approach by ruling that an accomplice under § 922(g)(1)
need only share the principal's knowledge that the principal possessed a gun. Id at 1527-28.
However, the Seventh Circuit's position has subsequently become less clear. In United States v
Samuels, 521 F3d 804 (7th Cir 2008), the Seventh Circuit stated in dicta that "to aid and abet a
felon in possession of a firearm, the defendant must know or have reason to know that the individual is a felon at the time of the aiding and abetting." Id at 812 (emphasis added). The court
provided no further discussion of the issue and did not reference its previous holding in Moore.
71
72
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The Third and Sixth Circuits' Knowledge or "Reasonable Cause
to Believe" Standard

In United States v Xavier, the Third Circuit explicitly rejected
strict liability for an accomplice under § 922(g)(1). 7' Rather, the court
held that "there can be no criminal liability for aiding and abetting a
violation of § 922(g)(1) without knowledge or having cause to believe
the possessor's status as a felon." 5
In Xavier, the defendant and his brother were at a grocery store
when the defendant spotted an individual, with whom his brother had
an ongoing dispute, in the store parking lot. 6 The defendant left the

premises by car and quickly returned with a different man, who
handed a gun to the defendant's brother." The defendant's brother
proceeded to shoot at the victim's car several times.7 8 The trial court
convicted the defendant of aiding and abetting several of his brother's
crimes, including his brother's possession of a firearm in violation of
§ 922(g)(1).7 9 On appeal, the defendant argued that the government
never proved he possessed knowledge of his brother's former conviction, which he claimed was an essential element of the crime.Y
The Third Circuit agreed with the defendant, holding that
"[u]nless there is evidence a defendant knew or had cause to believe
he was aiding and abetting possession by a convicted felon, [the evidence] has not shown [the] 'guilty mind"' required for accomplice liability.8 The court also reasoned that the mens rea for accomplice liability under § 922(g)(1) should be consistent with § 922(d)(1)." The
court stated that "[a]llowing aider and abettor liability under
§ 922(g)(1), without requiring proof of knowledge or reason to know
of the possessor's status, would effectively circumvent the knowledge

element in § 922(d)(1)," thus abrogating congressional intent.
In United States v Gardner,' the Sixth Circuit found the Third
Circuit's reasoning in Xavier persuasive and agreed that the govern-

2 F3d 1281 (3d Cir 1993).
Id at 1286.
75
Id (emphasis added). The courts use the terms "having cause to believe" and "reasonable cause to believe" interchangeably. This Comment uses "reasonable cause to believe" to mirror the language in § 922(d)(1).
76
Id at 1284.
77 Xavier, 2 F3d at 1284.
78
Id.
79
Id at 1284-85.
80 Id at 1286.
81 Xavier, 2 F3d at 1286-87.
82 Id at 1286.
83
Id.
84 488 F3d 700 (6th Cir 2007).
73
74
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ment must show that the accomplice "knew or had cause to know"
that the principal was a convicted felon for liability under
§ 922(g)(1)." The defendant in Gardner planned with several other
individuals to obtain five kilograms of cocaine by feigning desire to
purchase the drugs.6 Travon Gardner brought two weapons to the
transaction, intending initially to steal the drugs at gunpoint, and later
to deceive the seller with cut-up magazines disguised to look like
stacks of one-hundred dollar bills' In actuality, a federal informant
had arranged the deal, and the police arrested the group and seized
their weapons at the scene of the deal."
Gardner was charged with one count under § 922(g)(1) because
one of his cohorts was a convicted felon, and the jury returned a conviction under an aider and abettor theory. 9 The Sixth Circuit reasoned
that for the jury verdict to stand, the government must show "(1) an
act by a defendant that contributes to the commission of the crime;
and (2) the intent to aid in the commission of the crime."'
Although the defendant clearly assisted the principal's commission of the offense, the Sixth Circuit held that the defendant did not
possess the intent to aid the principal's crime required to trigger
§ 922(g)(1) accomplice liability."' The court discussed the circuit split,
commenting that the Ninth Circuit "offer[ed] little reasoning" for its
conclusions, in contrast to the Third Circuit's "well-reasoned" decision." While noting that "a felon who possesses a firearm can be presumed to have known of his status as a felon," the court stated that the
"presumption that a third party has knowledge of the principal's felonious status is on shakier ground."'
Following the reasoning in Xavier, the Sixth Circuit in Gardner
also observed that strict liability would afford a conviction under
§ 922(g)(1) in circumstances where a conviction could not be secured
under § 922(d)(1) due to the its mens rea requirement. The court
concluded that allowing such convictions to stand would write
§ 922(d) out of the statute. 9'

85

86
87
88
89
90
91

92
93
94
95

Id at 715.
Id at 707-08.
Id at 708.
Gardner, 488 F3d at 708.
Id at 713.
Idat714.
Id at 716.
Gardner, 488 F3d at 714-15.

Idat715.
Id.
Idat 715 n2.
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III. COMPARING THE SIDES OF THE SPLIT

The circuit courts have provided a starting point to determine the
appropriate mens rea under § 922(g)(1) for an accomplice with respect to the principal's felon status. Before exploring any potential
solutions to the circuit split, this Part analyzes the benefits and drawbacks of the positions advocated by the respective sides of the debate.
The positions are then weighed against each other to determine if either decisively prevails. This Comment concludes in Parts III.C and IV
that the "reasonable cause to believe" standard must be adopted for
the sake of preserving congressional intent, but that it would be improved significantly if coupled with a rebuttable presumption that
advances the policy benefits afforded by strict liability.
A. Analysis of the Strict Liability Standard
The strict liability standard, as advanced by the Ninth Circuit,
contains a number of practical virtues that support its application.
First and foremost, this standard prevents defendants who are actually
aware of the principal's felon status from evading liability because
knowledge remains very difficult for prosecutors to prove. Furthermore, as is generally the case with strict liability, this standard provides
law enforcement benefits based on increased deterrence and incapacitation." Such a standard also constitutes a clear and straightforward
rule; thus, the decision costs for courts to apply it in each circumstance
are minimal.7 The policy justifications for strict liability are particularly strong if the accomplice is actually aware of the principal's status in
a large majority of the prosecuted cases. In addition to these benefits,
strict liability would mirror the standard applied to the principal's
mens rea under § 922(g)(1), following the rule established by some
courts that "the knowledge of an aider and abettor need be no greater
than the knowledge of the principal."
Even so, the application of strict liability to these circumstances
raises a number of serious concerns. Strict liability increases the risk of
conviction where a defendant lacks the "purposivist" attitude tradi96 The incapacitation effect suggests that an increase in incarceration leads to a reduction
in crime. See William Spelman, CriminalIncapacitation 2 (Plenum 1994). Although this Comment assumes the existence of an incapacitation effect, it is worth noting that the extent of the
"incapacitation effect" has generated considerable debate. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Book
Note, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Is Blind Faith in IncapacitationJustified?, 105 Yale L J 1433,
1434 (1996).
97 See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 Cal L Rev 953, 972 (1995) ("Rules can, in
short, be the most efficient way to proceed, by saving time and effort, and by reducing the risk of
error in particular cases.").
98
Graves, 143 F3d at 1188 n 3. But see Part III.A.1.
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tionally associated with accomplice liability." Given the high penalty
associated with § 922(g)(1), strict liability may be particularly inappropriate in this context. Moreover, strict liability would increase the
tension between § 922(g)(1) and 922(d)(1). These concerns raised by
strict liability are addressed more fully below.
1. Strict liability for the felon's status may thwart traditional notions of accomplice liability.
Strict liability makes it more likely that defendants will be convicted despite their failure to evince a "purposivist" attitude towards
the principal's crime. Traditional notions of accomplice liability suggest it is insufficient for the defendant merely to have associated himself with the venture; rather, the government must prove that he
'
"[sought] by his action to make it succeed. ' lw
It is unsurprising, therefore, that some courts interpret aiding and
abetting violations as containing an "additional element of specific
intent, beyond the mental state required by the principal crime."'' ' A
specific intent crime is one that requires the government to prove that
"a defendant specifically intend[ed] the consequences of his or her
acts.""" In the context of aiding and abetting a violation of § 922(g)(1),
a specific intent requirement would suggest that the defendant must
have known the principal's felon status in order to intend the consequences of his act, and therefore must have possessed this knowledge
in order to be held liable. While not every circuit court agrees that
aiding and abetting is a specific intent crime, '°3 this notion does correspond to the "purposivist attitude" associated with accomplice liability.
Surprisingly, the Ninth Circuit has adopted such a specific intent
requirement for accomplices' despite claiming that, in the context of
§ 922(g)(1), strict liability for the felon's status "is consistent with the
general rule that the knowledge of an aider and abettor need be no
greater than the knowledge of the principal...... Perhaps the Ninth Circuit believes the standards should be identical with regard to the circumstance element of the crime, but that there is a higher standard for
the accomplice with regard to the conduct element of the crime.
99 See United States v Peoni, 100 F2d 401,402-03 (2d Cir 1938).
100 Id at 402.
101 United States v Sayetsitty, 107 F3d 1405,1412 (9th Cir 1997).
102 United States v Gruttadauro,818 F2d 1323, 1328 (7th Cir 1987).
103 See, for example, United States v Roan Eagle, 867 F2d 436,445 (8th Cir 1989) (indicating
that aiding and abetting is not a specific intent crime, and that conviction requires only sharing
the general requisite intent of the underlying offense).
104 See Sayetsitty, 107 F3d at 1412.
105 Graves, 143 F3d at 1188 n 3. See also United States v Torres-Maldonado, 14 F3d 95, 103
(1st Cir 1994); United States v Powell, 929 F2d 724,727-28 (DC Cir 1991).
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In any event, even where the defendant is aware that he is assisting the principal in securing a weapon, he may be unaware that he is
assisting a felon in securing a weapon. In such a case, it is difficult to
claim that the defendant evinced a purpose to commit the crime. Because only the existence of the circumstance element makes the defendant's assistance criminal, strict liability for the felon's status would
risk punishing defendants who did not demonstrate a specific purpose
to violate § 922(g)(1), thereby frustrating traditional notions of accomplice liability.
2. The application of strict liability presents unique concerns in
the context of § 922(g)(1), particularly given the significant penalty for violations of the provision.
The concerns raised in applying strict liability to accomplices are
only heightened by the high penalty associated with the § 922(g)(1)
offense-as much as ten years in prison."' The Supreme Court has
suggested that strict liability should generally apply to offenses where
the "penalties commonly are relatively small."'' In fact, in Staples v
United States,". the Court rejected the application of strict liability to a
circumstance element of a weapons offense, in part because the penalty
for the offense was ten years in prison.9
The Third Circuit expressed a related concern in Xavier, noting
that strict liability would be an unusually low mens rea standard because the criminality of § 922(g)(1) "depends on the status of the person possessing the firearm.." The criminality of many felonies, of
course, turns on the existence of a circumstance element. There are
three aspects of § 922(g)(1) accomplice liability, however, that make
the application of strict liability particularly problematic. First, in the
United States, gun ownership is a very common.. and often legally

106 It should be noted that the strict liability concerns in the context of accomplice liability
addressed in Part III.A.1 and III.A.2 are equally germane to principal liability under § 922(g)(1).
In the context of principal liability, however, courts generally have concluded that the principal is
overwhelmingly likely to possess knowledge of his felon status, thus diminishing the problems
raised in Part III.A.1 and III.A.2. See Part I.C.2. In contrast, courts are less confident about
inferring knowledge on the part of an accomplice. See Part I.C.3.
107 Morissette, 342 US at 256.

108 511 US 600 (1994).

109 Id at 616-19 (holding that the "potentially harsh penalty attached to violation of
§ 5861(d)" requires proof that the defendant knew that a weapon's characteristics brought it
within the statutory definition of a machine gun).
110 Xavier, 2 F3d at 1286.
111 See Staples, 511 US at 613-14 ("Roughly 50 percent of American homes contain at least

one firearm of some sort.").

The Mens Rea Dilemma

2009]

1303

innocent endeavor. "2 Because guns have been widely accepted as lawful possessions in the United States, the Supreme Court has made
clear that their destructive potential alone is insufficient to put gun
owners on notice as to the likelihood of regulation, and therefore
strict liability is inappropriate for the circumstance element of certain
weapons offenses.13 Second, the circumstance element may be very
difficult for a third party to ascertain. Where the defendant is not a
firearms vendor, and therefore does not have access to a background
check system, it could be extremely burdensome for a third party to
obtain information regarding the principal's felon status. Finally, as
discussed above, a convicted accomplice to § 922(g)(1) can receive as
much as ten years in prison for the offense. Thus, while conviction for
unintentional behavior is an essential feature of strict liability, the substantial penalty triggered by violating § 922(g)(1) cautions against applying strict liability to the felon's status.
3.

Strict liability for the felon's status creates a tension with
18 USC § 922(d)(1).

Perhaps the strongest critique of applying strict liability in this
context, however, is that it leads to statutory inconsistency. As noted
by the Third Circuit in Xavier, the application of strict liability to an
accomplice for the principal's status under § 922(g)(1) would create
significant tension with § 922(d)(1).'" Section 922(d)(1) proscribes the
sale or disposal of a firearm to a felon, whereas § 922(g)(1) proscribes
the possession of a firearm by a felon. Whenever an individual sells a
firearm to a felon, that individual is potentially an accomplice to the
firearm possession as well. If strict liability is applied to accomplices
under § 922(g)(1), then prosecutors could "effectively circumvent" the
mens rea requirement in § 922(d)(1) by charging defendants under
§ 922(g)(1) instead."' The Xavier court reasoned that such maneuvering would abrogate congressional intent by dispensing with the clear
mens rea requirement provided in § 922(d)(1). " '
The tension between the provisions raises the following question: is
accomplice liability under § 922(g)(1) wholly superfluous in relation to
§ 922(d)(1), in which case the specific mens rea standard provided by
Congress in § 922(d)(1) would arguably predominate? At first blush,
accomplice liability under § 922(g)(1) might appear entirely unneces112 See id at 610 ("[TIhere is a long tradition of widespread lawful gun ownership by private
individuals in this country.").
113 See id at 612.
114 See 2 F3d at 1286.
115 Id.
116 Id. See also Gardner,488F3d at 715.
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sary because such activity is covered directly under § 922(d)(1). By proscribing the "sale" or "disposal" of weapons to felons, § 922(d)(1) would
include many cases in which individuals aid the possession of firearms
by convicted felons. Since the statute now applies to all individuals rather than just firearms vendors,"7 it is not immediately apparent if
§ 922(g)(1) accomplice liability adds anything to §922(d)(1)."'
Upon closer examination, it becomes clear that the two provisions do not perfectly overlap. While all activity that would trigger
principal liability under § 922(d)(1) would also trigger accomplice liability under § 922(g)(1), the opposite does not hold true. An example
from the Third Circuit illustrates the point. In Xavier, the defendant
drove to pick up a third party in order for that individual to bring a gun
to the defendant's brother. ' These circumstances would suffice for accomplice liability under § 922(g)(1), assuming that the defendant satisfied the court's mens rea test, since the defendant aided his brother's
violation of § 922(g)(1). The defendant in Xavier could not, however, be
held liable as a principal under § 922(d)(1). The defendant neither
"sold" nor "dispose[d]" of a firearm to his brother, as required for principal liability under § 922(d)(1). ' Rather, it appears the defendant never even touched the gun." ' This discrepancy, though narrow, suggests
that accomplice liability under §922(g)(1) is not superfluous.
Moreover, the case law suggests that § 922(d)(1) has been applied
almost exclusively to commercial transactions.'22 In contrast, firearms
vendors have rarely, if ever, been prosecuted as accomplices under
§ 922(g)(1). The different realms of application are not circumscribed
by the statutory language; prosecutors theoretically could take advantage of strict liability under § 922(g)(1) to circumvent the mens rea
requirement in § 922(d) provided by Congress. Thus, applying the
strict liability standard to § 922(g)(1) would create a troubling increase in tension between the two provisions.
At the same time, it should be noted that § 922(d)(1) is superfluous in light of accomplice liability under §922(g)(1). Anytime an
See notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
§ 922(d)(1) could be eliminated instead of accomplice liability under
§ 922(g)(1), the former is a clear and direct expression of congressional will. Because accomplice
liability under § 922(g)(1) is derivative, this offense could more justifiably be eliminated by
courts than principal liability under § 922(d)(1).
119 See Xavier, 2 F3d at 1284.
120 See 18 USC § 922(d)(1).
121 See Xavier, 2 F3d at 1284.
122 See, for example, United States v Rose, 522 F3d 710, 712 (6th Cir 2008) (affirming the
conviction of a defendant charged with selling a firearm to a felon under § 922(d)(1)); United
States v Haskins, 511 F3d 688,690 (7th Cir 2007) (same); United States v McConnel, 464 F3d 1152,
1154, 1164 (10th Cir 2006) (same).
117

118 Although
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individual "sells" or "disposes" of a firearm to a convicted felon, that
individual is aiding and abetting that felon's commission of the
§ 922(g)(1) offense. An argument therefore could be made that the
mens rea provided in § 922(d)(1) should carry little weight because
the provision is swallowed by accomplice liability under § 922(g)(1).
It would be unsound, however, to ignore the difficulties posed by
the mens rea language in § 922(d)(1) when considering § 922(g)(1)
based on the reasoning that the former is technically superfluous in
light of the latter. The mens rea in § 922(d)(1) demonstrates a specific
expression of congressional will that should not lightly be disregarded.
Congress simply may not have considered derivative liability with respect to § 922(g) when it drafted § 922(d), in which case ignoring the §
922(d) mens rea language would risk eviscerating congressional intent.
The Third and Sixth Circuits therefore highlight a significant problem
with adopting strict liability for the felon's status in prosecutions for
accomplices under § 922(g)(1).
B.

Analysis of the Knowledge or "Reasonable Cause to Believe"
Standard

The Third and Sixth Circuits offer compelling reasons for applying the knowledge or "reasonable cause to believe" standard with respect to the principal's felon status for § 922(g)(1) accomplice liability.
This standard preserves consistency between § 922(g)(1) and
922(d)(1), avoiding the potential for a loophole to prosecute firearms
vendors in a manner contrary to congressional intent. Moreover, the
heightened mens rea requirement helps ensure that a defendant lacking the criminal mind for the offense does not receive significant prison time and also preserves traditional notions of purposivism in accomplice liability.12
This standard also contains a number of drawbacks. First, there is
no reason to believe that Congress intended the mens rea standard in
§ 922(d)(1) to alter accomplice liability under § 922(g)(1), weakening
the case for a strict application of the former's mens rea to the latter
provision. Second, the "reasonable cause to believe" standard provides less clarity than strict liability, thus requiring greater resources at
the point of judicial application. Finally, the knowledge or "reasonable
cause to believe" standard may be too easy for defendants to circumvent, thereby serving to underdeter potential criminals and thwart
effective law enforcement. Each of these arguments against the knowledge or "reasonable cause to believe" standard is addressed in turn.
123 See Part III.A.3.
124

See Part III.A.1-2.
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1. Congress likely did not intend to affect § 922(g)(1) when it
passed § 922(d)(1).
Contrary to the arguments of the Third and Sixth Circuits," the
presence of § 922(d)(1) may cut against applying the "reasonable
cause to believe" standard to § 922(g)(1). A textualist interpretation
would suggest that Congress knew precisely how to include a mens
rea requirement for the felon's status, as it had previously decided to
include such a standard in § 922(d)(1). Congress was certainly aware
of the existence of § 922(d)(1) when it passed the current version of
§ 922(g)(1), as § 922(d)(1) was amended when Congress consolidated
§ 922(g)(1) in its present form. '26 Application of the expressio unius
canon 2 would indicate, therefore, that Congress deliberately chose to
omit a mens rea requirement for the felon's status in § 922(g)(1).
But even if Congress did not specifically intend to omit a mens
rea requirement in § 922(g)(1), it is worth noting that Congress likely
did not mean to implicate § 922(g)(1) when it enacted § 922(d)(1) ."
As noted above, Congress originally intended § 922(d)(1) to apply
only to firearms dealers and manufacturers. 1 9 Congress broadened the
language to "any person" to encompass situations where a third party
would be used to facilitate these "vendor-type" transactions. " °
If Congress had not broadened the language of § 922(d)(1)-for
reasons irrelevant to § 922(g)(1)-strict liability for § 922(g)(1) accomplices would not disturb § 922(d)(1). A prosecutor who attempted
to charge a vendor under § 922(g)(1) would likely fail because the
activity would be directly covered under the more specific "vendor"
provision, and normally a specific and "carefully drawn" statute prevails over a more general one."' When Congress broadened the language of § 922(d)(1) beyond dealers and manufacturers, this alteration
increased the tension with § 922(g)(1) because the former was no
longer significantly narrower than the latter. As such, a defendant
could potentially be charged under either provision.3 2 However, ConSee Part II.B.
See notes 14 and 47 and accompanying text.
127 The canon inclusio unius est exclusion ahterius means "[t]he inclusion of one thing suggests the exclusion of all others." William N. Eskridge, Jr, Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in
125

126

Statutory Interpretation, 66 U Chi L Rev 671, 674 (1999). But consider United States v Vonn, 535

US 55,65 (2002) (noting that this canon of construction should only be used as a "guide").
128 At the time that § 922(d)(1) was enacted, the predecessor statutes to the current version
of § 922(g)(1) were operative. See note 15 and accompanying text.
129 See note 45 and accompanying text.
130 See note 47 and accompanying text.
131 See Morales v Trans World Airlines, Inc, 504 US 374,384-85 (1992).
132 For vendor-type transactions, § 922(d)(1) remains slightly narrower than § 922(g)(1)
because § 922(d)(1) specifically refers to the "sale" of weapons. This discrepancy likely is not
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gress's reasons for broadening the language of § 922(d)(1) appear to
have been wholly unrelated to prosecutions under § 922(g)(1).
Thus, it is not so obvious that courts should read § 922(d)(1)'s
mens rea requirement into § 922(g)(1), especially since it is highly unlikely that Congress intended in amending § 922(d)(1) to make it
harder to prosecute accomplices under § 922(g)(1). To the contrary,
Congress passed § 922(d)(1) to make it easierto combat firearm transfers to convicted felons.'33 Therefore, although the two provisions
should remain consistent to avoid a mens rea loophole, the mens rea
standard should be tailored, if possible, to better reflect the particular
problems that arise in prosecutions under § 922(g)(1)."
2. The "reasonable cause to believe" standard lacks the clarity
and efficiency of strict liability.
The knowledge or "reasonable cause to believe" standard is more
costly for courts to apply than strict liability because it requires a caseby-case determination of the particular facts of each situation. The
lengthy discussion of the issue in Xavier and Gardner, compared to
the Ninth's Circuit's brief treatment in Graves and Canon,bolsters the
claim that decision costs for courts differ significantly between the two
requirements.
Of course, strict liability generally creates fewer decision costs for
courts faced with determining liability for a particular defendant,3 '
relative to the difficulties associated with applying a heightened mens
rea standard. However, the difference is exacerbated when-as in the
instant case-the mens rea requirement is relatively unclear. The
mens rea term of "knowledge" is fairly simple: the defendant must
possess actual, subjective knowledge, which can include awareness of a
high probability of a fact's existence."' The meaning of "reasonable
cause to believe" is murkier. This language is not commonly employed

significant enough, however, to bar the use of § 922(g)(1) in vendor-type transactions on the
grounds that § 922(d)(1) is more specific. Certainly the Third and Sixth Circuits believe that a
vendor potentially could be charged under either provision. See Part II.B.
133 See text accompanying notes 43-47.
134 In other words, prosecutions that do not involve a typical vendor situation.
135 See Sunstein, 83 Cal L Rev at 955,972-74 (cited in note 97) (noting that while dogmatic
application of rules can be problematic, rules in general possess several benefits, including a
reduction of informational and political costs when rendering decisions).
136 Model Penal Code (MPC) § 2.02(7) (ALl 1962) (stating that when "knowledge of the
existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is
aware of a high probability of its existence, unless he actually believes that it does not exist").
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in the federal criminal code; however, the standard is used in other
places 37 and has generated additional confusion and disagreement.'m
Courts have interpreted "reasonable cause to believe" as an objective standard that, when viewed from the standpoint of a reasonable person in the defendant's position, involves a level of certainty
that is practically equivalent to knowledge. In the context of
§ 922(g)(1), the Eleventh Circuit has stated that having "reasonable
cause to believe" means "to have knowledge of facts which, although
not amounting to direct knowledge, would cause a reasonable person,
knowing the same things, reasonably to conclude that the other person
was a convicted felon.' 39 This interpretation suggests that "reasonable
cause to believe" is a relatively difficult mens rea requirement for
prosecutors to meet. A reasonable person must "conclude" based on
the circumstances that the other individual was a convicted felon; a
strong probability of this fact would not suffice. Although its objective
nature makes it easier to prove than knowledge, the standard is still
more stringent than negligence or recklessness, which involve only a
"substantial risk" of a fact being present.'0 Furthermore, unlike knowledge, recklessness, or negligence, there is little case law applying the
"reasonable cause to believe" standard. The contours of the standard
therefore remain particularly unclear, requiring that courts expend
effort to determine what the standard means before they can even
apply it to the particular circumstances of a given case.
3. It is virtually impossible for prosecutors to meet the knowledge or "reasonable cause to believe" standard, even in cases
where the defendant possessed knowledge or strong suspicion
of the principal's felon status.
From a law enforcement standpoint, the knowledge or "reasonable cause to believe" standard is almost impossible to establish, even
in situations where the defendant had good reason to suspect that the
principal was a convicted felon at the time of assisting the § 922(g)(1)
violation. While this is a concern with objective mens rea standards in
general, the problem is further exacerbated in the realm of § 922(g)(1)
137 See, for example, 21 USC § 841(c)(2) (making it illegal for any person to knowingly or
intentionally possess or distribute "a listed chemical knowing, or having reasonablecause to believe,
that the listed chemical will be used to manufacture a controlled substance") (emphasis added).
138 See, for example, United States v Khatab, 536 F3d 765, 769 (7th Cir 2008) (noting the
circuit split over whether "reasonable cause to believe," in the context of § 841(c)(2), constitutes
a wholly objective test, or whether it should be assessed based on the defendant's state of mind).
139 United States v Peters, 403 F3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir 2005), quoting Eleventh Circuit
Pattern Jury Instruction: Criminal § 34.5 (2003).
140 See MPC § 2.02(2)(c)-(d).
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accomplice liability because accomplices are better able than principals to exploit plausible deniability regarding the felon's criminal history. In most instances, a principal is aware of his own felon status, yet it
is less common to know another's criminal history. The stringent interpretation by the Third and Sixth Circuits-which, as discussed
above, requires the prosecutor to prove something close to actual
knowledge-makes it nearly impossible to achieve a conviction in
circumstances where the defendant was likely aware of a significant
risk that the principal was a convicted felon.
As an example of the difficulties faced by prosecutors in establishing that the defendant possessed "reasonable cause to believe,"
consider Gardner, discussed in Part II.B. In that case, the defendant
Gardner plotted with three other men to secure a large amount of
cocaine in a major drug deal.' The leader of Gardner's group, Lorenzo McMillion, set up the transaction. Prior to it transpiring, the men
decided to take the drugs by force.' 2 The group purchased duct tape
and gloves. ' When the men again left to go to the drug "deal"-which
was actually a set-up-Gardner brought two different nine-millimeter
weapons for stealing the drugs.'" The men were apprehended at the
scene of the would-be transaction.15
McMillion was a convicted felon, and McMillion's conviction under § 922(g)(1) was upheld under a constructive-possession theory
the scene.".
because McMillion drove the car with the weapons to
Gardner's conviction as an accomplice to McMillion's violation, however, was overturned on the grounds that the evidence did not show
that Gardner possessed knowledge or "reasonable cause to believe"
that McMillion had a prior felony conviction."7
It appears highly unlikely that Gardner truly lacked any "reasonable cause to believe" that McMillion had a criminal history. At the
very least, the fact that McMillion set up a major drug deal should
have caused Gardner to strongly suspect McMillion had a criminal
history. As will be discussed in Part IV, an individual's participation in
a felony dramatically increases the probability that the participant
previously received a felony conviction. ' It also makes good policy
sense to switch the burden to the defendant in such cases to clarify the

141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148

Gardner, 488 F3d at 707.
Id.
Id.
Id at 708.
Gardner, 488 F3d at 708.
Id at 714.
Id at 716.
See Part IV.B.1.
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principal's criminal record." 9 Therefore, the "reasonable cause to believe" standard-as currently applied-is potentially too difficult for
the prosecution to satisfy, thus underdeterring criminals and frustrating reasonable law enforcement objectives.
C.

Weighing the Standards against Each Other

When attempting to resolve this circuit split, one difficulty that
arises is that the best legal conclusion does not necessarily align with
the best policy conclusion. While there are persuasive textual arguments in favor of both sides of the circuit split,"o the extensive congressional debates and lobbying surrounding the passage of
§ 922(d)(1) caution against allowing §922(g)(1) to potentially circumvent an explicit mens rea requirement provided by Congress in
§ 922(d)(1)."' On the other hand, policy considerations tilt in favor of
strict liability, particularly if culpable defendants could frequently
evade the "reasonable cause to believe" mens rea requirement.'52
The most convincing interpretation based on the statutory text
must dominate over policy considerations; therefore, this Comment
concludes that the knowledge or "reasonable cause to believe" standard
must be retained as a baseline for resolving the circuit split. However,
the tension between the provisions appears accidental, and the chief
reason for applying the knowledge or "reasonable cause to believe"
standard is to avoid a loophole for prosecutions under § 922(d)(1).
Section 922(d)(1) was passed primarily to regulate commercial
firearms dealers and manufacturers, "3 whereas § 922(g)(1) consolidated several offenses aimed at keeping firearms out of the hands of convicted felons.'-" The Third and Sixth Circuits, in directly transplanting
the § 922(d)(1) language to non-vendor situations, have not been sensitive enough to the different contexts § 922(d)(1) and 922(g)(1) were
meant to address. Because non-vendor situations -typically prosecuted under § 922(g)(1)-are much less likely to involve criminal history
databases, knowledge or even "reasonable cause to believe" becomes
significantly more difficult to prove. Furthermore, the Third and Sixth
Circuits may be interpreting "reasonable cause to believe" in a more
stringent manner than it has typically been used for § 922(d)(1) violations."' These courts do not explore whether there is the potential to
See id.
See Part III.A.3 and III.B.1.
151 See Hardy, 17 Cumb L Rev at 595-604 (cited in note 6).
152 See Part III.B.3.
153 See note 45 and accompanying text.
154 See notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
155 See Part IVB.2.
149
150
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preserve statutory consistency while also maintaining the viability of
§ 922(g)(1) accomplice liability prosecutions.
In cases that do not involve vendor-type transactions, courts
should employ flexibility when interpreting the mens rea language,
such that it advances the policy considerations better served by strict
liability. A critical weakness of the "reasonable cause to believe" standard, when compared with strict liability, is that it may be too hard for
prosecutors to prove. The standard should therefore be easier to establish, particularly in those situations where the defendant was likely
aware of the principal's felon status.
It would be nearly impossible, of course, to ascertain every case
where the defendant was likely to possess actual knowledge. But in
general, actual knowledge is more probable in cases where the defendant and principal were engaged in a separate felonious undertaking
during the commission of the § 922(g)(1) offense. Isolating such cases
would be preferable to a blanket lowering of the "reasonable cause to
believe" standard, however, because the carve-out would only implicate defendants who were "on notice" to expect regulation and who
were not engaged in otherwise innocent activity."6 This Comment's
solution is aimed precisely at creating such a carve-out.
IV. THE SOLUTION: "REASONABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE" AND
CONCURRENT FELONIOUS ACTIVITY

This Comment proposes a more careful application of the "reasonable cause to believe" standard, such that the mens rea will be easier
to prove when the defendant was likely aware of the principal's criminal history. Specifically, this Comment advocates that courts combine
the mens rea standard with a rebuttable presumption that the defendant had "reasonable cause to believe" that the principal was a felon in
cases where the § 922(g)(1) offense was committed in furtherance of a
separate felonious activity in which the defendant and the principal
were jointly engaged.'

156

See United States v X-Citement Video, Inc, 513 US 64,72-73 (1994) (explaining that "Moris-

sette, reinforced by Staples, instructs that the presumption in favor of a scienter requirement should
apply to each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct").
157 Rebuttable presumptions are not uncommon in criminal law. See, for example, Rucker v
Davis, 237 F3d 1113, 1126-27 (9th Cir 2001) (noting that when drug-related activity occurs within
a tenant's apartment, there exists a rebuttable presumption that the tenant controls what occurs
there); 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 34 (discussing the rebuttable presumption in many states
that a child between the ages of seven and fourteen is not culpable for criminal activity). In
addition, the rebuttable presumption solution advocated in this Part bears some similarity to the
Pinkerton doctrine in conspiracy. Under Pinkerton v United States, 328 US 640 (1946), a party to
a conspiracy may be held strictly liable for the substantive offense committed by a co-conspirator
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Courts would effectively carve out cases involving concurrent felonious activity by shifting the burden to the defendant in the form of a
rebuttable presumption. In cases of concurrent felonious activity, it is
more likely that the defendant actually was aware of the principal's felon
status. Common sense suggests that two individuals familiar enough to
collaborate on such an endeavor are more likely to possess knowledge of
each other's past than two strangers engaged in a brief encounter.
Even if the defendant did not possess actual knowledge of the
principal's status, there are other justifications for the defendant assuming the burden in this circumstance. The principal's involvement in a
current felony makes it much more probable that the principal committed a past felony; thus, the defendant was put on notice that the principal was particularly likely to be a felon. Also, the concurrent felonious
activity puts the defendant on notice to expect regulation of the firearm involved in the offense, as the firearm is no longer being used
solely for an innocent purpose. The provision of constructive notice
therefore supports shifting the burden to the defendant in cases of
concurrent felonious activity, regardless of whether the defendant possessed actual knowledge of the principal's status.
Part IV.A begins with an explanation of how the rebuttable presumption would function. Part IV.B explores justifications for the concurrent felonious activity carve-out, demonstrating that this solution is
well-grounded in both law and policy. Part IV.C concludes with a discussion of the likely practical effects of the rebuttable presumption.
A. An Explanation of the Rebuttable Presumption Solution
The rebuttable presumption would work as follows: If the defendant committed the § 922(g)(1) violation in a manner unconnected
with other felonious activity, the knowledge or "reasonable cause to
believe" standard would apply; however, if the defendant and the
principal committed the § 922(g)(1) offense in furtherance of separate
felonious activity, the court would presume that the defendant had
"reasonable cause to believe" that the principal was a convicted felon.
The defendant would then assume the burden of demonstrating that
he was unaware of the principal's criminal history. The defendant
could overcome the presumption by presenting evidence that he truly
did not possess knowledge or reason to know of the principal's past
conviction. For example, if the defendant offered convincing evidence
that the principal misled the defendant regarding the principal's felon

in furtherance of the conspiracy, so long as the co-conspirator's act was a reasonably foreseeable
consequence of the conspiracy. See id at 647-48.
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status, such evidence would relieve the defendant of liability." ' A thirdparty witness could also provide such evidence, including an individual
involved in the concurrent felonious activity with the defendant and
the principal (though, of course, the factfinder would have to make a
credibility determination). Another situation in which the presumption could be overcome is if the defendant was present when the principal purchased a firearm from a licensed dealer who conducted a
background check. Absent evidence that the defendant knew the
principal deceived the vendor regarding his criminal history, the approval of a registered firearms dealer who conducted a legitimate
background check should suffice to rebut the presumption.
It is worth stressing two aspects of the rebuttable presumption.
First, the presumption would only apply to those cases where the
weapon was secured in furtherance of a separate felony-mere concurrent felonious activity would not suffice. This feature serves to distinguish those felonies committed at the "spur of the moment" from
those that required advanced knowledge on the part of the defendant.
Such a distinction helps ensure that prior to supplying the weapon, the
defendant was aware of the heightened risk that the principal was a
convicted felon.
Another aspect worth noting is that the rebuttable presumption
is triggered only when the defendant and the principal were both engaged in the concurrent felonious activity. In determining the probability that the principal engaged in past felonious activity, it is the
principal's engagement in current felonious activity that should matter."' However, requiring that the defendant also be engaged in the
concurrent felonious activity serves two useful goals. First, the court
will not be burdened with determining whether the defendant knew
the principal was engaged in the additional criminal activity-such
knowledge can be presumed through the defendant's active participation in the criminal venture. Second, the defendant's purposivist attitude is partially demonstrated by the defendant's desire to have the
secondary criminal activity succeed.'6° These limitations on the rebuttable presumption help ensure that the proposal is both easy for
courts to apply and consonant with accomplice-liability principles.

158 This solution is distinguishable from a strict liability carve-out, as the presumption would
remain fully rebuttable by exculpatory evidence, such as a third-party witness. Even so, it may be
difficult for the defendant to secure the evidence that would be required to rebut such a presumption. It could be the case, therefore, that a large percentage of defendants would be convicted when the circumstances surrounding the § 922(g)(1) offense involved concurrent felonious activity, assuming the other requirements for conviction are met.
159 See Part IV.B.1.

160

See Part IV.B.4.
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Support for the Rebuttable Presumption Solution

This Part explores how the rebuttable presumption solution incorporates advantages from each side of the circuit split, adopting the
best legal conclusion while also serving Congress's intention in passing
§ 922(g)(1) to "eliminate firearms from the hands of criminals, while
interfering as little as possible with the law abiding citizen......

1. Participation in concurrent felonious activity significantly increases the probability that the principal previously has been
convicted of a felony.
In assessing the implications of concurrent felonious activity, it is
useful to ask the following question: how suspicious should the defendant have been regarding the principal's criminal background, given
the defendant's knowledge that the principal was presently engaged in
or preparing for another felony? The most relevant study, conducted
by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, tracked the criminal histories of
felons in large urban counties for 2004. ' This data sheds some light on
the following question: given a felony, what is the likelihood that the
felony was committed by someone who was already a convicted felon?
The statistics show, unsurprisingly, that a substantial percentage
of felony offenders had been previously convicted of a felony offense.
For example, given a violent assault (as in Xavier), there was approximately a 39 percent likelihood that the perpetrator-the principalwas a convicted felon.' Given a drug offense (as in Gardner), it was
roughly 50 percent likely that the perpetrator-the principal-was a

convicted felon."4
In addition, data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics suggest that
the principal's current participation in a felony indicates that it is
roughly six times more probable that the principal has a previous felo161

United States v Weatherford, 471 F2d 47, 51 (7th Cir 1971). It is worth noting that some

arguments in this Part also apply to principal liability under § 922(g)(1), over which disagreement remains in the circuit courts as to the proper mens rea standard for the felon's status. See
Part I.C.2. In particular, the arguments in this Part regarding the expectation of heightened
regulation in the context of concurrent felonious activity would apply with equal force to principal violators. See Part IV.B.3. While § 922(g)(1) principal liability is beyond the scope of this
Comment, the rebuttable presumption solution could be applied to the mens rea disagreement
discussed in Part I.C.2.
162 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties; 2004-Statistical
Tables; Table 8, Most Serious PriorConviction of Felony Defendants; by Most Serious CurrentArrest
Charge (2004), online at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/html/fdluc/2004/tables/fdluc04st08.htm
(visited Sept 1, 2009) (including violent offenses, property offenses, drug offenses, and public-order
offenses).
163 Id.
164

Id.
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The concurrent felonious activity therefore dramati-

cally increases the likelihood that the principal's possession of a firearm would violate § 922(g)(1).

This probability increase is sufficient to justify transferring the
burden to the defendant to learn the principal's felon status. First, it is
more likely in such cases that the defendant actually possesses knowledge of the principal's status. The defendant is not only aware of the
principal's current involvement in criminal activity, but also knows the
principal sufficiently well to collaborate in this activity. Common sense
suggests that in such circumstances, defendants will frequently possess
actual knowledge of the principal's criminal history.
Even when the defendant did not possess such knowledge, the

probability increase, in light of the current felony, supports switching
the onus to the defendant in these circumstances. While the defendant
is not expected to know the relevant statistics, it makes good policy
sense to place a heavier burden on the accomplice to inquire into the

principal's past in situations where it is far more likely that the prin' This observation supports the applicacipal has a felony conviction. 66
tion of a strong presumption-though rebuttable-that the defendant
had "reasonable cause to believe" that the principal was a convicted
felon when the defendant committed the offense in furtherance of

concurrent felonious activity with the principal.
2. A rebuttable presumption would help achieve convictions in
circumstances where the defendant very likely possessed

knowledge of the principal's felon status.
Congress likely included the "reasonable cause to believe" lan-

guage in § 922(d)(1) because knowledge is very difficult for the prose165 This figure was obtained by first calculating the probability that a person arrested for a
felony in the 2004 study already had a felony conviction (approximately 46 percent). That probability was then divided by the probability that a person from the general population was a
convicted felon (roughly 7.5 percent in 2004, according to Christopher Uggen, Jeff Manza, and
Melissa Thompson, Citizenship, Democracy, and the Civic Reintegration of Criminal Offenders,
605 Annals Am Acad Polit & Soc Sci 281, 288 (2006)). Note that this figure is subject to several
caveats. First, the Table of Felony Defendants tracks individuals in large urban counties, and such
individuals may have higher recidivism rates than the overall population. Also, the statistics
reflect those defendants arrested for a felony in 2004. The number of defendants who were actually convicted is likely smaller (though not by much, given the high rates of conviction for
criminal offenses).
166 A potential objection to the rebuttable presumption is the existence of other factors an
accomplice could take into account when assessing the likelihood of a previous felony conviction, such as race or gender. Needless to say, policy considerations cut strongly against applying a
rebuttable presumption based on those factors. Predicating a rebuttable presumption on race or
gender, as opposed to criminal activity, would punish a defendant based on immutable characteristics rather than prior engagement in crime.
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cution to prove. The "reasonable cause to believe" standard remains
troubling, however, because it may be too difficult for the prosecution
to establish in cases where a reasonable person would be highly suspicious of the principal's felon status-such as when the principal engaged in separate felonious activity with the defendant. While a reasonable person would not necessarily possess knowledge of the principal's criminal history in these circumstances, a reasonable person
would be aware of a significant increase in the probability that the
principal was a convicted felon.
As the Third and Sixth Circuits have applied the "reasonable
cause to believe" standard, 67' defendants in these circumstances usually
will not be convicted, despite the fact that they were likely aware of a
significant risk that the principal possessed a criminal history. These
circuit courts may be applying the standard even more stringently
than it is typically applied under § 922(d)(1). The Seventh Circuit, for
example, affirmed the conviction of a defendant under § 922(d)(1) for
selling a firearm to a convicted felon where the defendant "knew [the
principal] had been in some [previous] trouble, [but] he did not know
the specifics or whether [the principal] had been imprisoned."' 1 As the
Third and Sixth Circuits have applied the "reasonable cause to believe" standard, it is unlikely the defendant would have been convicted in analogous circumstances under § 922(g)(1).
Moreover, the desire to effectuate a separate criminal activity
may cause the defendant to deliberately avoid knowledge of the principal's felon status, even though the defendant's suspicions are raised.
A defendant may go so far as to exhibit "deliberate ignorance" or
"willful blindness." The defendant in Gardner,69 for example, likely
"saw and experienced enough suspicious activities to raise several red
flags" regarding the possibility that the principal was a convicted felon.",° Such cases may "support[] an inference that [the defendant]
consciously chose not to pursue the truth," as necessary for a willful
blindness jury instruction. 7 '
While the circumstances will not always rise to the level of willful
blindness, they may frequently come very close in the context of concurrent felonious activity planned between the defendant and the

See Part II.B.
United States v Haskins,511 F3d 688, 691 (7th Cir 2007).
169 See Part III.B.3.
170 Consider United States v Craig, 178 F3d 891, 896 (7th Cir 1999) ("We have held that the
[willful blindness] instruction is proper when the defendant claims a lack of guilty knowledge
and there are facts and evidence that support an inference of deliberate ignorance.") (quotation
marks omitted).
171 Id.
167
168
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principal. A rebuttable presumption that the defendant possessed
"reasonable cause to believe" the principal's felon status in such circumstances presents an effective means of preventing defendants
from skirting the "reasonable cause to believe" standard, thus mitigating the problems raised by the standard as currently applied.
3. Concurrent felonious activity should heighten the defendant's
expectation of firearms regulation.
One argument that has been vigorously raised in the context of
principalliability under § 922(g)(1) is that strict liability for the felon's
status would violate the Morissette presumption. 72 The Morissette presumption favors a mens rea requirement for each statutory element
that criminalizes otherwise innocent conduct. 3 In Staples, the Court
expanded upon Morissette by emphasizing that courts determining the
appropriate mens rea standard should consider "the expectations that
individuals may legitimately have in dealing with the regulated
items.' ' . The Morissette presumption further suggests that courts
should apply a more stringent mens rea requirement where there is
concern of "placing ordinary citizens at risk of criminal prosecution
for 'otherwise innocent conduct."... Morissette and its progeny have
indicated that the greater the degree of regulation within an arena, the
more reasonable it is to hold the defendant strictly liable for the activity. Because this Comment does not advocate a strict liability standard,
it does not directly implicate the Morissette presumption. Nevertheless, the Morissette line of cases can be broadly read to support a lower
mens rea standard in the context of concurrent felonious activity, due
to the highly regulated nature of such criminal activity.
Firearms are heavily regulated generally, and are particularly
heavily regulated in the context of their relationship to other crimes
through mechanisms like sentence enhancements.1 7 6 Even so, the Supreme Court has made clear that the "destructive potential" of firearms, in and of itself, "cannot be said to put gun owners sufficiently on

172 See Langley, 62 F3d at 614 (Phillips concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("And
where, as here, the specific question has been whether such a requirement runs not only to those
elements that define the core conduct proscribed but also to any elements that define circumstances upon which criminality of the conduct turns, the Supreme Court's answer uniformly has
been 'yes."').
173
174

See Part I.C.2.
511 US at 619.

Langley, 62 F3d at 607, quoting United States v X-Citemnent Video, Inc,513 US 64,72-73 (1994).
See, for example, 18 USC § 924(c)(1) (providing a sentence enhancement for any defendant
"who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime ... uses... a firearm").
175

176
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notice of the likelihood of regulation" with respect to the circumstance element of an offense. 1"
In considering § 922(g)(1), however, there is an additional factor
that justifies the defendant losing his expectation of freedom from
heightened regulation-his use of the weapon in furtherance of a concurrent felony offense. The principal and defendant's involvement in
another felony at the time of the § 922(g)(1) violation puts the defendant on notice to expect regulation of weapons in those circumstances.
In the context of effectuating a separate felonious activity, the principal
and the accomplice are not using the firearm for a lawful purpose, and
thus are not engaging in "otherwise innocent conduct. '78 Even if the
principal and the defendant both lacked any mens rea with respect to
the principal's status when committing the §922(g)(1) offense, the firearm would not have been used solely for "otherwise innocent" activity.
The defendant therefore should assume that the use of a firearm in the
context of felonious activity would be highly regulated, and the rebuttable presumption shifts the burden to the defendant to discover the
principal's criminal history in these circumstances.
4. The rebuttable presumption would maintain the purposivist
quality of accomplice liability.
As discussed previously, well-settled notions of accomplice liability suggest that an accomplice must express a purposivist attitude towards the principal's crime.179 One concern with strict liability is that
this standard makes it easier to convict a defendant who did not purposefully aid a violation of § 922(g)(1). 1' Any lowering of the mens rea
requirement across the board, in fact, could potentially eliminate the
"purposivist" aspect of § 922(g)(1) accomplice liability. The rebuttable
presumption solution, however, helps to ensure that § 922(g)(1) primarily targets "purposivist" violations, and is therefore an improvement over both strict liability and a blanket lowering of the "reasonable cause to believe" standard.
When a defendant aids a § 922(g)(1) violation in the absence of
concurrent criminal activity, the defendant likely evinces no special
desire to see the venture succeed. Unless the principal pays the defendant for the weapon, in which case the activity would be covered directly under § 922(d)(1), the defendant is unlikely to possess a special
interest in the principal's possession of the firearm.
Staples, 511 US at 612.
See X-Citement Video, Inc, 513 US at 72-73.
179 See Part I.C.3.
180 See Part III.A.1.
177
178
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When the defendant and the principal are engaged in a separate
criminal offense, however, the defendant likely maintains a strong desire for the felon to succeed in receiving the firearm, as the felon's possession will assist the criminal enterprise. "' It is precisely in such circumstances that the defendant is most likely to satisfy Learned Hand's
"purposivist" test for accomplice liability.
Notably, the stronger the defendant's desire to effectuate separate
felonious activity, the more likely it becomes that the defendant will
choose to remain deliberately ignorant of the principal's felon status.
Inquiries into the principal's criminal history would only frustrate the
defendant's investment in the larger criminal enterprise. As such, in
these circumstances the defendant may be less likely to possess actual
knowledge of the felon's status -precisely because the defendant maintains the "purpose" to have the criminal venture succeed.
Courts should therefore consider the possibility of an overarching
criminal purpose when determining whether the defendant satisfies
traditional notions of accomplice liability under § 922(g)(1). Although
the separate felonious activity does not prove a criminal purpose under
§ 922(g)(1), the activity is strong evidence that such a purpose exists. A
rebuttable presumption would account for the defendant's larger criminal goals in circumstances where the defendant engaged in concurrent
felonious activity with the principal. Unlike strict liability, the rebuttal
presumption proposal thus fully accords with traditional notions of accomplice liability; although it eases the prosecution's burden for a category of cases, the presumption would not trigger the "purposivist" concerns raised by strict liability.
5. The rebuttable presumption would preserve consistency between § 922(g)(1) and 922(d)(1).
By adopting the knowledge or "reasonable cause to believe"
standard, the rebuttable presumption solution also remains fully consonant with § 922(d)(1). Although this solution would enable prosecutors to secure § 922(g)(1) convictions more easily in cases of concurrent
felonious activity, the proposal is not in tension with the mens rea requirement in § 922(d)(1) because the mens rea would be identical between the two provisions. In addition, firearms vendors-the target of
§ 922(d)(1) prosecutions -would typically not trigger the rebuttable
presumption for accomplice liability under § 922(g)(1). Legitimate vendors are unlikely to be engaged in separate felonious activity with the
principal violator of the provision. Prosecutors therefore would not gain
181 See, for example, Gardner, 488 F3d at 707-08; United States v Moore, 936 F2d 1508,
1512-13 (7th Cir 1991).
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any advantage by choosing accomplice liability under § 922(g)(1) rather
than principal liability under §922(d)(1). In both cases, the knowledge
or "reasonable cause to believe" standard would apply and the rebuttable presumption would not be available to the prosecutor.
A case could arise, of course, that implicated both §922(d)(1) and
the rebuttable presumption solution for § 922(g)(1). For example, a
firearms dealer could be charged with selling a gun to a convicted felon,
having received payment in cocaine rather than cash. While the mens
rea standard would be the same under both provisions, the concurrent
felonious activity would afford the prosecutor the advantage of the rebuttable presumption if the defendant were charged under §922(g)(1).
There may not be anything particularly troubling, however, about
allowing the rebuttable presumption to apply under § 922(g)(1) in
such a case. After all, when Congress included a mens rea requirement
in § 922(d)(1), it was likely concerned about the prosecution of unintentional missteps by otherwise legitimate firearms vendors. Such concerns would not be fully present in the context of concurrent felonious
activity, and so prosecution under § 922(g)(1)-even with the rebuttable presumption -is unlikely to abrogate congressional intent.
For that matter, courts should consider applying the rebuttable
presumption directly to § 922(d)(1). The text of the provision would
not preclude such a presumption, and there are strong policy considerations in support of this construction (similar to those supporting a
rebuttable presumption in § 922(g)(1)).'82 The rebuttable presumption
solution therefore serves not only as an improvement over strict liability with regard to statutory consistency; it may also provide judges
with a new tool to address criminal charges under § 922(d)(1).
C.

The Solution's Practical Effects

Although the real-world effects of the solution proposed by this
Comment are difficult to determine, a few observations can be made.
For one, the rebuttable presumption is more likely to alter the plea
bargaining process than deter criminal behavior. As previously noted,
defendants are rarely charged only with accomplice liability under
§ 922(g)(1).'83 Rather, prosecutors usually tack on the offense to a
more serious charge against the defendant. A charge of accomplice
liability under § 922(g)(1) likely serves as a bargaining chip in plea
negotiations regarding a greater offense. Prosecutors can induce more
plea deals by offering to drop the §922(g)(1) count in exchange for a

182 See Part IV.B.1-4.
183

See Part I.C.3.
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plea bargain. It follows that if the prosecutor were required to prove
the defendant's mens rea for the § 922(g)(1) charge, then the defendant might be less enticed to plead guilty. Conversely, strict liability
would make a plea deal more attractive.
The rebuttable presumption proposed by this Comment would
have two distinct effects on the plea bargaining process, depending on
the circumstances. In cases of concurrent felonious activity, the prosecutor could more easily secure a conviction for the § 922(g)(1) charge,
thus making the defendant more likely to plead guilty. When no concurrent felonious activity is involved, however, the prosecutor's bargaining power would be reduced accordingly.
The deterrence benefits offered by this solution are harder to predict. An individual that has decided to engage in separate felonious behavior with the principal, despite potential repercussions, is unlikely to
be concerned with additional repercussions based on the principal's
criminal past. Still, successful § 922(g)(1) convictions would result in
longer prison sentences, which may result in general deterrence benefits.
Finally, with regard to the incapacitation effect, the rebuttable
presumption would result in increased prison sentences for defendants simultaneously convicted of other-likely more serious-felony
offenses. The merits of such an effect can be debated on policy
grounds, ' but this Comment's solution would keep certain criminals
in prison for longer than if the mens rea were harder to satisfy, potentially causing some reduction in overall crime."6
CONCLUSION

This Comment examines the circuit split that has arisen over the
appropriate mens rea standard for accomplice liability under
§ 922(g)(1) with regard to the principal's status as a convicted felon. The
Comment analyzes the virtues and drawbacks of the approaches taken
by both sides of the circuit split. It ultimately concludes that the knowledge or "reasonable cause to believe" standard must be retained for
statutory consistency, as the strict liability standard poses a significant
risk of prosecutors circumventing the mens rea requirement in
§ 922(d)(1), thereby abrogating congressional intent. At the same time,
the Comment argues that the "reasonable cause to believe" standard184 The Supreme Court generally sanctions such plea bargaining. See Bordenkircher v
Hayes, 434 US 357, 364 (1978) ("[C]onfronting a defendant with the risk of more severe punishment ... is an inevitable-and permissible-attribute of any legal system which ... encourages
the negotiation of pleas.").
185 See Sharkey, 105 Yale L J at 1434 (cited in note 96) ("Incapacitation lies at the core of
the emotionally and ideologically charged debate about crime.").
186 See id.
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at least as applied by the Third and Sixth Circuits-makes §922(g)(1)
accomplice liability far too difficult for prosecutors to prove.
To address this shortcoming, this Comment concludes that the
"reasonable cause to believe" standard should be combined with a rebuttable presumption that the defendant possessed "reasonable cause
to believe" that the principal was a convicted felon when the
§ 922(g)(1) offense was committed in furtherance of concurrent felonious activity engaged in by the principal and the defendant. This solution would assist the conviction of defendants who would avoid conviction under a stringent application of the "reasonable cause to believe"
standard despite likely possessing the "guilty mind" for the offense.
Even when the defendant did not possess knowledge of the principal's
status, this Comment argues that the separate felonious activity puts the
defendant on notice with respect to increased firearms regulation and
to the increased probability that the principal is a felon, thereby justifying a presumption that transfers the burden to the defendant. This proposal thus represents the best legal and policy solution to the circuit
split, as it ensures that § 922(g)(1) remains a valuable law enforcement
tool while also preserving congressional intent, statutory consistency,
and consonance with traditional notions of accomplice liability.

